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1. Introduction
The rise of multinational enterprises (MNEs) from emerging markets is topical, important 
and poses a number of questions and challenges that require considerable attention in the futu-
re from academia as well as business management. Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
from non-European emerging regions is not a new phenomenon, what is new, is the magnitude 
that this phenomenon has achieved over the past one and a half decade. The recent takeovers 
of high-profile companies in developed or developing countries by non-European emerging-
market MNEs (EMNEs) – such as Lenovo, Wanhua (China), Hindalco (India), CVRD (Brazil), 
Cemex (Mexico), Lukoil (Russia), etc. – as well as the greenfield or brownfield investments of 
emerging companies (such as Huawei, ZTE, Tata, Pepco, etc.) show a new trend where new kind 
of firms become major players globally. According to the World Investment Report investments 
from emerging-markets reached a record level: “developing Asia now invests abroad more than 
any other region. Nine of the 20 largest investor countries were from developing or transition 
economies” (UNCTAD 2015: ix.).
Today, the rise of EMNEs is driven by the Asian economy, mainly China and India, however, 
this process is broader, incorporates a growing number of developing economies and comple-
mented by the growing share of emerging markets in world exports (Sauvant 2008, Nölke 2014). 
In addition, non-European EMNEs have become important players in several regions around 
the globe, ranging from the least developed countries of Africa through the developing markets 
in Latin America and Asia to the developed countries of the United States or the European 
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Union, including East Central European (ECE, i.e. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia) countries (for an excellent analysis on FDI in ECE region see Szent-Iványi, 2017). 
In line with the above, the paper focuses on the driving forces (especially the push factors) 
behind the international expansion strategy of non-European EMNEs by comparing the cases 
of Chinese and Brazilian OFDI. Brazil and China are two large emerging economies revealing 
many cultural, historical, economic, political and institutional differences. At the same time they 
are the two largest emerging economies among developing countries to invest abroad, and to 
conquer on world markets by successfully internationalizing public and private companies since 
the Millennium. In terms of promoting OFDI both countries have extensively relied on public 
policies and this makes their comparative analysis expedient. 
The differences and similarities between these two countries might help us to underline our 
theoretical argument on the distinctiveness of EMNE’s internationalization strategies, especially 
regarding the role of home country governments in driving OFDI. At the same time the compa-
rison of these two cases makes it also possible to draw generalizable lessons for other developing 
countries with similar endowments and/or policy aims.
After mapping out investment flows and types of involvement, the main focus is on identi-
fying the motivations of Chinese and Brazilian FDI, with a special emphasis on structural/mac-
roeconomic and institutional as well as political factors. According to our preliminary hypot-
hesis push determinants of these investments indeed differ from that of Western companies 
in terms of specific institutional and political factors that seem important for non-European 
EMNEs. This hypothesis echoes the call to combine macroeconomic and institutional factors 
for a better understanding of internationalization of companies (Dunning and Lundan 2008). At 
the same time, however, the paper also reveals important differences between the Chinese and 
Brazilian going global strategies, with significant consequences for their ‘economic rationality’ 
and potential effects on their longer term domestic economic development (via the potential of 
OFDI to promote structural changes in the domestic economy). 
After the introductory section, in the second chapter, we briefly summarize the existing the-
ories of internationalization and foreign direct investment, including mainstream theories and 
new theoretical avenues. The third and fourth chapter describes the driving forces behind the 
international expansion strategies of Chinese and Brazilian MNEs, respectively, by presenting 
the historical evolution and main characteristics of outward foreign direct investment as well 
as the main push drivers and public policies. The fifth chapter concludes by comparing the two 
cases and highlighting major similarities and differences, as well as summarizing main findings 
and policy implications.
2. Theory and data
Majority of research on motivations for FDI apply the eclectic or OLI paradigm by Dun-
ning (1992, 1998) that states that firms will venture abroad when they possess firm-specific 
advantages, i.e. ownership and internalization advantages, and when they can utilize location 
advantages to benefit from the attractions these locations are endowed with. Different types of 
investment motivations attract different types of FDI which Dunning (1992, Dunning-Lundan 
2008) divided into four categories: market-seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking and as-
set-seeking. Localization advantages “comprise geographical and climate conditions, resource 
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endowments, factor prices, transportation costs, as well as the degree of openness of a country 
and the presence of a business environment appropriate to ensure to a foreign firm a profitable 
activity” (Resmini, 2005:3). Much of the extant research and theoretical discussion is based on 
FDI outflows from developed countries for which market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI is 
most prominent (Buckley et al., 2007; Leitao-Faustino, 2010).
As mentioned above, although Asian FDI is not a new phenomenon, but what is different today 
is the scale of the phenomenon and the pace it has evolved since the early 2000s. In particular, since 
China launched its „go global” strategy (2000) and started to invest more and more globally. Nevert-
heless, traditional economic factors seem to be insufficient in explaining FDI decisions of MNEs. 
In the last decade international economics and business researchers acknowledged the importance 
of institutional factors in influencing the behaviour of MNEs (e.g., Tihanyi et al., 2012). Institutions 
serve to reduce uncertainties related with transactions and minimize transaction costs (North, 1990). 
Meyer and Nguyen (2005: 67) argue that informal constraints are “much less transparent and, there-
fore, a source of uncertainty”. As a result, Dunning and Lundan (2008) extended OLI model with the 
institution-based location advantages which explains that institutions developed at home and host 
economies shape the geographical scope and organizational effectiveness of MNCs.
The rapid growth of outward FDI from emerging and developing countries resulted in nu-
merous studies trying to account for special features of emerging MNEs' behaviour that is not 
captured within mainstream theories. For example, Mathews extended OLI paradigm with lin-
king, leverage, learning framework (LLL) that explains rapid international expansion of com-
panies from Asia Pacific (Mathews, 2006). Here linking means partnerships or joint ventures 
that latecomers form with foreign companies in order to minimize risks involved with interna-
tionalization as well as to acquire “resources that are otherwise not available” (Mathews, 2006: 
19). Latecomers when forming links with incumbents also analyse how the resources can be 
leveraged. They look for resources that can be easily imitated, transferred or substituted. Finally, 
repeated processes of linking and leveraging allow latecomers to learn and conduct international 
operations more effectively (Mathews, 2006: 20).
Although emerging-market MNEs from various emerging countries differ in many respects 
but to some extent they share common characteristics. For example, Peng (2012) reports that 
Chinese MNEs are characterized by three relatively unique aspects: (1) the significant role play-
ed by home country governments as an institutional force, (2) the absence of significantly su-
perior technological and managerial resources, and (3) the rapid adoption of (often high-profile) 
acquisitions as a primary mode of entry. Kalotay and Sulstarova (2010) highlights that Russian 
MNEs’ investments are also influenced by home country policies while Barnard (2010) writes 
about the lack of strong firm capabilities among MNEs from South Africa and Taiwan. Gubbi 
et al. (2010) find that Indian MNEs are also fond of undertaking acquisitions overseas. Since 
2002 a marked shift in corporate attitude towards global markets took place in Brazil, too, but 
“multi-latinas“ have emerged throughout Latin America (Casanova-Kassum, 2013). According 
to Gubbi and Sular (2015) Turkish firms seem to be using the European countries to (1) present 
themselves as a European Union company, (2) make use of special features of these countries to 
expand their businesses within and to other countries and, (3) make use of the favourable tax 
treatment policies available to foreign investors. At the same time while some emerging-market 
MNEs focus on neighbouring regions, others target the global market, including the countries 
of the developed world.
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Figure 1. Chinese and Brazilian outward FDI stock, million USD, 1990-2017
Data source: UNCTAD
Figure 2. Chinese and Brazilian outward FDI flows, million USD, 1990-2017
Data source: UNCTAD
As the above figures show OFDI has started to gain momentum after the New Millennium 
both in China and Brazil. 2008 was the first year when Chinese outward FDI stock exceeded the 
Brazilian stock of OFDI. The year of the global economic and financial crisis indeed provided 
a tremendous impetus to Chinese OFDI, while the growth of Brazilian outward investments 
remained rather modest.
In this paper we especially focus on the significant role played by home country governments 
as an institutional force, by explicitly comparing the Chinese and Brazilian state-led OFDI stra-
tegies. As we shall see both governments pursued pro-active and interventionist strategies to 
promote the international expansion of their MNEs, which thus constitutes to be a distinctive 
feature of EMNE’s behaviour if compared to developed MNE’s. Comparing however the Chinese 
and Brazilian OFDI strategies we will shed light to important differences between them, and will 
draw relevant policy implications from this analysis, which might provide useful lessons also for 
other emerging economies. 
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3. Driving forces behind the international expansion 
strategies of Chinese MNEs
Chinese outward FDI has increased in the past decades, however, in the last decade this 
process accelerated significantly. In 2012, China became the world’s third largest investor – up 
from sixth in 2011 – behind the United States and Japan with an outward FDI flow of 84 billion 
US dollars and it still hold its position: the value of Chinese outward FDI grew to 183 billion US 
dollars in 2016, making Chinese MNEs the largest overseas investors among developing count-
ries (UNCTAD 2017). According to Hanemann and Huotari (2017), the volume of investments 
has further increased in 2016 and has reached 200 billion USD, with a 40 per cent increase com-
pared to the previous year. Several factors fuelled this shift, including the Chinese government’s 
wish for globally competitive Chinese firms or the possibility that outward FDI can contribute 
to the country’s development via multiple channels, such as through 1. investments in natural 
resources exploration, 2. export of domestic technologies, products, equipment, and labour, 3. 
technological upgrading or 4. by increasing competitiveness through promoting brands and by 
building global networks of sales, supply and production (Sauvant – Chen, 2014: 141-142; Luo et 
al, 2010: 76; Caseiro – Masiero, 2014: 248). 
3.1 Historical overview of the evolution of Chinese OFDI 
In China, in hand with the so-called “Open Door” policy reforms, from the late 70s, the 
government encouraged investments abroad to integrate the country to the global economy, 
although the only entities allowed to invest abroad were state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The 
total investment of these first years was not significant and concentrated to the neighbouring 
countries, mainly to Hong Kong. The regulations were liberalized after 1985 and a wider range 
of enterprises – including private firms – was permitted to invest abroad. After Deng Xiaoping’s 
famous journey to the South in 1992, overseas investment increased dramatically, Chinese com-
panies established overseas divisions almost all over the world, concentrated mainly in natural 
resources. Nevertheless, according to UNCTAD statistics, Chinese outward FDI averaged only 
453 million US dollars per year between 1982 and 1989 and 2.3 billion between 1990 and 1999.
In 2000, before joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Chinese government ini-
tiated the go global or “zou chu qu” policy, which was aimed at encouraging domestic companies 
to become globally competitive. They introduced new policies to induce firms to engage in over-
seas activities in specific industries, notably in trade-related activities. In 2001 this encourage-
ment was integrated and formalized within the 10th five-year plan, which also echoed the im-
portance of the go global policy (Buckley et al 2008). This policy shift was part of the continuing 
reform and liberalization of the Chinese economy and also reflected Chinese government’s de-
sire to create internationally competitive and well-known companies and brands. Both the 11th 
and 12nd five-year plan stressed again the importance of promoting and expanding outward 
FDI, which became one of the main elements of China’s new development strategy.
Chinese outward FDI has steadily increased in the last decade (see Figure 1. and 2.), particu-
larly after 2008, due to the above-mentioned policy shift and the global economic and financial 
crisis. The crisis brought more overseas opportunities to Chinese companies to raise their share 
in the world economy as the number of ailing or financially distressed firms has increased. Whi-
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le outward FDI from the developed world decreased in several countries because of the recent 
global financial crisis, Chinese outward investments increased even greater: between 2007 and 
2011, outward FDI from developed countries dropped by 32 per cent, while China’s grew by 
189 per cent (He-Wang, 2014: 4; UNCTAD 2013). As a consequence, according to the World 
Investment Report 2013, in the ranks of top investors, China moved up from the sixth to the 
third largest investor in 2012, after the United States and Japan – and the largest among develo-
ping countries – as outflows from China continued to grow, reaching a record level of 84 billion 
US dollars in 2012. Thanks largely to this rapid increase of China’s outward FDI in recent years; 
China also became the most promising source of FDI when analysed FDI prospects by home 
region (UNCTAD 2013: 21).
3.2 Characteristics of Chinese foreign direct investment globally4
Although traditionally Chinese outward FDI is directed to the countries of the developing 
world, Chinese investments into the developed world, including Europe increased significantly 
in the past decade. According to the Clegg and Voss (2012), Chinese outward FDI to the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) increased from 0.4 billion US dollars in 2003 to 6.3 billion US dollars in 2009 
with an annual growth rate of 57 per cent, which was far above the growth rate of Chinese out-
ward FDI globally. In 2016, Chinese companies invested 35 billion EUR in the EU, a 77 per cent 
increase from the previous year (Hanemann-Huotari, 2017: 4). While the resource-rich regions 
remained important for Chinese companies, they started to become more and more interested 
in acquiring European firms after the financial and economic crisis. The main reason for that is 
through these firms Chinese companies can have access to important technologies, successful 
brands and new distribution channels, while the value of these firms has fallen, too, due to the 
global financial crisis (Clegg – Voss, 2012: 16-19.).
Figure 3. Geographical distribution of China’s outward FDI stock, by the end of 2017
Data source: MOFCOM / NBS, PRC
4 This section is partly based on a previous research of the author and the book chapter, Szunomár Á, Bie-
dermann Zs. (2014: 7-33).
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Although this increase is impressive by all means, according to Chinese statistics, China still 
accounts for less than 10 per cent of total FDI inflows into the EU or to the US. However, during 
the examination of the actual final destination of Chinese outward FDI, Wang (2013) found 
that – as a result of round-tripping investments – developed countries receive more Chinese 
investments than developing economies: according to his project-level data analysis, 60 per cent 
of Chinese outward FDI went to developed economies like Australia, Hong Kong, the United 
States, Germany, and Canada.
Regarding the entry mode of Chinese outward investments globally, greenfield FDI is con-
tinues to be important, but there is a trend towards more mergers and acquisition (M&A) and 
joint venture projects overseas. Overall, greenfield investments of Chinese companies outpace 
M&As in numerical terms, however, greenfield investments are smaller in value in total as these 
include the establishment of numerous trade representative offices.
As Clegg and Voss note (2012: 19), the industry-by-country distribution of Chinese outward 
FDI is difficult to determine from Chinese statistics. However, based on their findings, it can be 
stated that Chinese investments in mining industry are taking place mainly in institutionally 
weak and unstable countries with large amounts of natural resources and that these investments 
are normally carried out by SOEs. Investments in manufacturing usually take place in large 
markets with low factor costs, while Chinese companies seek technologies, brands, distribution 
channels and other strategic assets in institutionally developed and stable economies.
In developed economies Chinese investment are less dominated by natural resource seeking 
or trade-related motives but more concerned with the wide range of objectives, including mar-
ket-, efficiency- and strategic assets-seeking motives. In the case of developed countries, Chinese 
SOEs usually have the majority of deal value but non-state firms make the greater share of de-
als (Rosen and Hanemann, 2013: 71). In addition to greenfield investments and joint ventures, 
China's merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in developed countries has recently gained a 
momentum and continue an upward trend since more and more Chinese firms are interested in 
buying overseas brands to strengthen their own. 
As partly mentioned above, a further Chinese specificity is, that state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) account for a large majority of OFDI – according to some estimates in 2009 SOEs ac-
counted for 69 per cent of OFDI stocks and 16 of the 18 largest Chinese MNEs were either state-
owned or state-controlled (Xue et al., 2010). According to Scissors (2014: 5) however the role of 
Chinese ownership status is overblown as Chinese rule of law is weak, which means that a priva-
tely-owned company has to face as much pressure and constraint as its state-owned competitor. 
Nevertheless, it is worth to differentiate between SOEs, which has two types: locally administe-
red SOEs (LSOEs) and centrally administered SOEs (CSOEs). Most of the LSOEs operate in the 
manufacturing sector and they are facing competition from both private companies and other 
LSOEs, while CSOEs are smaller in number but more powerful as they operate in monopolised 
industries such as finance, energy or telecommunication (He-Wang, 2014: 6).
Although the share of private firms is growing, SOEs still account for the majority – more 
than two-thirds – of total Chinese outbound investments, however, the range of investors is 
broader, next to state-owned and private actors it includes China’s sovereign wealth fund and 
firms with mixed ownership structure. The role of SOEs seems to be declining in the past few 
years, although the government will continue to emphasize their importance as they rely on the 
revenue, job creation and provision of welfare provided by the SOEs (He-Wang, 2014: 12).
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3.3 What is behind Chinese OFDI?: push factors and public policies
Driving forces of OFDI can be grouped into push and pull factors (or home country and 
host country determinants, respectively), to differentiate the factors that drive investment out of 
the home country, or attract investments into another country. In this paper we concentrate on 
the home country determinants, the so-called push factors, as we are especially interested in the 
very specific role, home country governments might play in promoting the internationalization 
of EMNEs.
Several types of push factors contribute to the internationalization of companies from deve-
loping countries. We can differentiate between institutional and structural push factors. Struc-
tural push factors - such as gross domestic product (GDP), export-orientedness, interest rates, 
stock returns or exchange rate volatility - are related to the home country's domestic economy 
and market. Institutional push factors are related to the distance between home and host country 
- such as, for example, cultural proximity that can be measured by the size of the Chinese dias-
pora in the host country - or government policy (for country and industry recommendations), 
including specific incentives, taxes, or the role of different actors, and their interplay (Voss et al., 
2009; Schüler- Zhou and Schüller, 2009; Luo et al., 2010. 
Irwin and Gallagher (2014) found that - unlike Japan or Korea - China’s market entry has 
more to do with developing project expertise and supporting exports than it does with tariff- 
hopping or outsourcing industries fading on the mainland. They identified two major reasons 
for China’s high (31%) ratio of outward FDI lending to total outward FDI: „First, China has a 
greater incentive to give outward FDI loans than Japan or Korea ever did because its borrowers 
are state-owned so it can more easily dictate how they use the money. Second, China has a gre-
ater capacity to give outward FDI loans because it has significantly higher savings and foreign 
exchange reserves than Japan and Korea, both today and especially during equivalent develop-
mental stages” (Irwin-Gallagher, 2014: 22-23)
According to the go global strategy, Chinese companies should evolve into globally compe-
titive firms, however, Chinese companies go abroad for varieties of reasons. The most frequently 
emphasized motivation is the need for natural resources, mainly energy and raw materials in 
order to secure China’s further development (resource-seeking motivation). Mutatis mutandis, 
they also invest to expand their market or diversify internationally (market-seeking motivation). 
Nevertheless, services such as shipping and insurance are also significant factors for outward 
FDI for Chinese companies if they export large volumes overseas (Davies, 2013: 736). Despite 
China’s huge labour supply, some companies move their production to cheaper destinations (ef-
ficiency-seeking motivation), to, for example, Southeast Asia. Recently, China’s major companies 
also looking for well-known global brands or distribution channels, management skills, while 
another important reason for investing abroad is technology acquisition (strategic asset-seeking 
motivation). Scissors (2014: 4) points out that clearer property rights – compared to the domes-
tic conditions – are also very attractive to Chinese investors, while Morrison (2013) highlights 
an additional factor, that is, China’s accumulation of foreign exchange reserves: instead of the 
relatively safe but low-yielding assets such as US treasury securities, Chinese government wants 
to diversify and seeks for more profitable returns.
In China, initially, only large state-owned enterprises from the natural resource sector were 
supported to invest abroad to overcome the resource scarcity of the Chinese economy. Later 
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on, to help small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) develop their international markets, a 
government regulation on capital support for SMEs was introduced in 2000, at the very begin-
ning of the ‘going-global’ policy. In contrast, the promotion of outward FDI by privately-owned 
companies was only approved in February 2006. 
Through the approval process for outward FDI projects and access to foreign exchange and 
preferential loans, the government can exert direct influence on the growth and patterns of out-
ward investments. The Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM) 
requested that companies invest in countries that 
1. have a close relationship with China, 
2. exhibit complementarities to the Chinese economy, 
3. are important trading partners of China, 
4. have signed investment and taxation agreements, and 
5. are part of an important economic region in the global economy (MOFCOM, 2004).
The Chinese "Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment"
The "Catalogue" has usually been issued by National Development and Reform Commis-
sion and the Ministry of Commerce. Initially, in the early 2000's, there were 67 recommended 
countries and seven recommended industries for Chinese outward FDI. The country recom-
mendations included 26 Asian countries (three in Central Asia), 13 African countries, 12 
European countries (ten of them in the European Union, old member states + CZ, HU, PL), 
11 countries in North and South America, and five countries in Oceania. 
The Catalogue retains the classification of industries based on those that are encouraged, 
restricted, or prohibited. For manufacturing, the most recommended industries are usually 
electric machines and consumer electronics, while for services, trade and distribution were 
suggested most often. In the highly technologically developed EU member countries, France, 
Germany, the UK, and Sweden, investment in R&D was advocated as well. Rather surprising-
ly, investment in IT services was recommended in the ‘new’ EU member countries.
China is indeed paradigmatic for state control of major corporations. However, in opposi-
tion to older versions of state capitalism and developmental states, there is neither a classical 
top-down control nor a "single-guiding enterprise model" such as the South Korean Chaebol 
or Japanese Keiretsu system. We can distinguish between different views on the characteristics 
of Chinese state control. One possible opinion is Nölke et. al.'s (2015) state-permeated market 
economy, where mechanisms of loyalty and trust between members of state-business coalitions 
are based on informal personal relations. Witt and Redding (2013) consider the Chinese system 
as a system combining predatory elements with personal relations, while the Chinese themselves 
are emphasizing the advantages of the strong but effective government that provides internal as 
well as external stability.
We also support the idea that China forms a unique model on its own, that can be characterized 
by a sustained - or even never-ending - transition from socialism to capitalism. In China, there are 
new forms of profit-oriented and competition-driven state-controlled enterprises, such as China 
Mobile, that have emerged recently, while there are several private firms and public-private hybrids, 
such as Huawei, Lenovo or Geely, that have also been able to became successful companies on the 
Chinese market as well as globally (Nölke et. al. 2015). These days, such non-state - but politically 
BLAHÓ ANDRÁS KÖSZÖNTÉSE 177INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MULTIDISCIPLINARY DOCTORAL SCHOOL
supported - national firms are considered as ‘national champions’ by state managers (Naughton, 
2007; Ten Brink, 2013). With some exceptions - such as IT sector, which is deeply integrated into 
global production networks - most industries are dominated by national (state-controlled, hybrid 
and private) capital and not by foreign multinationals (Nölke et. al. 2015).
Regarding mechanisms of economic coordination, decision-making in most Asian states is 
usually statist. Here, the exception is Japan, which tends toward corporatism, while China is 
characterised by a mixture of top-down statism with a strong bottom-up element. In China, local 
variations in institutions, or even informal institutions often supersede formal institutions, (Witt 
and Redding 2013). Successful institutional innovations diffuse across different localities and 
inform national level institutional changes (Xu, 2011).
Since Chinese corporate governance is a mixture of top-down and bottom-up control, it is 
characterised by multiplexity, i.e. the presence of multiple business systems: non-competitive 
state-owned, profit-oriented and competition-driven state-controlled (such as China Mobile) as 
well as private firms (Huawei, Lenovo or Geely). Informality as well as guangxi ("net of relations", 
i.e. personal relations) also plays an important role in decision making.
4. Driving forces behind the international expansion strategies 
of Brazilian MNEs
In the early 2000s amid a rather prosperous and conducive external environment a funda-
mental shift took place in Brazilian economic policies. Outward orientation became the “name of 
the game” and has started to determine Brazil’s new attitude towards the global market. Several 
large Brazilian companies became prominent actors on the global level (global players), such as 
Petrobras (the national oil giant), Odebrecht (construction company), JBS (the meat processing 
company) or even Embraer (the aircraft manufacturer). There were even Brazilian brands that 
became known globally (such as the Havaianas). This move of Brazilian companies entering the 
global market was driven on the one hand by a dynamically ascending Brazilian economy and 
on the other hand by a deliberate economic policy change. President Lula urged already in 2003 
the internationalization of Brazilian companies, and several measures and instruments were put 
into force to help the aim of Brazilian companies “going global”.
4.1 Historical overview of the evolution of Brazilian OFDI
Historically Brazilian companies (both state- and privately-owned ones) were rather focusing 
on local (and regional) markets. There is a complexity of reasons beyond this, but the long period 
of import substitution industrialization and the large domestic market as well as the abundance 
of natural resources have without doubt played important roles. As a result Brazilian companies 
in general have had little incentive (and often also important competitiveness constraints) to 
expand to foreign markets. This picture has changed significantly in the early 2000s, when the 
boom in outward foreign direct investment started and marked the beginning of a new era.
In the mid of the 90s, after the economic stabilization and market-oriented reforms, Brazil em-
erged as an important recipient of FDI flows. It was however only after 2003 when Brazil became a 
significant investor abroad – in parallel with emerging countries, such as China (Figure 1. and 2.). 
Outward FDI flows from Brazil started to gain momentum as a result of two (coinciding) events. 
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First, in economic front the export boom (based mainly of primary commodities export) generated 
increasing trade surplus, and this hand in hand with large flows of incoming FDI and the apprecia-
tion of the Real (the Brazilian currency), have boosted foreign exchange reserves, which has meant 
a favourable scenario for Brazilian firms to invest abroad. Mostly export-led Brazilian companies in 
industries, where Brazil traditionally enjoyed competitive advantages (such as iron ore, steel, meat, 
soybeans, etc.) have benefitted from improved access to domestic financial markets for financing 
their (mainly) market-seeking investments abroad (Campanario et al., 2012). In more general terms, 
the global market opportunities have also favoured these firms, as commodity prices were booming, 
fuelled by increasing demand from China, and led to (overly) optimistic atmosphere in global mar-
kets and rising investor’s confidence. Not surprisingly, looking at the sectorial division we can see an 
increase towards the natural resources sector (metals, mining, oil, gas and steel) (Resende et al., 2010).
Second, on the policy front, these favourable economic conditions were accompanied by a funda-
mental shift in Brazilian policy attitude toward global markets (Casanova – Kassum, 2014: 68). This can 
be best illustrated with the address of the former Brazilian President, Lula urging Brazilian companies to 
go global in 2003 (at a meeting of the Portuguese Industrial Association in Lisbon): “It is time for Brazi-
lian businessmen to abandon their fear of becoming multinational businessmen” (UNCTAD, 2004: 1).
In 2006 the total Brazilian Direct Investments abroad outweighed the incoming Foreign Di-
rect Investments in Brazil. An unprecedented event, showing the internationalization process of 
a country that explicitly aimed at consolidating its position as a global player also regarding its 
outward direct investment flows. However, this was an exceptional year, and this performance 
can easily be explained by the Vale’s acquisition of the Canadian Inco for an estimated 17 billion 
US dollars (Resende et al, 2010: 99).
It is not unique that yearly amounts of Brazilian OFDI are dominated by one or two transacti-
ons of the given year5, as indicated also by the relative low volume – most of all in the early 2000s 
– and relative high year-to-year volatility. Outward investment flows surpassed the 10 billion dollar 
threshold in 2006 in Brazil, with an average being below 1 billion dollars between 2000 and 2003 
on a yearly basis, while between 2004 and 2008 the average jumped close to 17 billion (BCB, 2017).
Furthermore, and also less surprisingly OFDI trends of Brazilian companies tend to highly corre-
late with the general economic trends of Brazil. It is straightforward to see how OFDI became negati-
ve as a response to the 2009 financial crisis, as foreign affiliates of Brazilian multinational enterprises 
started to repatriate capital to their parent firms mainly via intra-firm lending. Similar – divestment 
– tendencies can be captured during the last years, since the economic crisis that started in 2014.
4.2 Characteristics of Brazilian foreign direct investment globally
Brazilian OFDI started to conquer world markets around 2003. This surge in foreign invest-
ment was mainly driven by high commodity process and increasing demand from Asia (mainly 
China), and thus mostly dominated by resource-based companies (such as Petrobras and Vale), 
5 In 2004 for example the merger between Ambev (a Brazilian drinks group) and Interbrew (a Belgium-
based brewer) with its value of 5 million US dollars has accounted for more than the half of that year’s total 
Brazilian OFDI (with increased intra-company loans also accounting for 22 per cent of total outward flows 
that year) (UNCTAD, 2004).
BLAHÓ ANDRÁS KÖSZÖNTÉSE 179INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MULTIDISCIPLINARY DOCTORAL SCHOOL
which executed large-scale acquisitions in neighbouring and more distant (developed and emer-
ging) markets. Thus during the late 2000s mostly export-led Brazilian companies in industries, 
where Brazil traditionally enjoyed competitive advantages (such as iron ore, steel, meat, soybe-
ans, etc.) have benefitted from improved access to domestic financial markets for financing their 
(mainly) market-seeking investments abroad. The most highlighted case was that of the Vale, 
and its acquisition of the Canadian firm Inco in 2006. This transaction has alone represented 
60 per cent of the total Brazilian OFDI flow that year. Besides the favourable international con-
ditions (serving as pull factors), domestic economic growth, rising sales and public investment 
have acted as domestic push factors as these made it easier for companies to turn their attention 
towards international markets (as business has been doing well at home).
Resende et al. (2010: 99) draw attention to the fact, that not all Brazilian internationalized 
companies are primarily active in the commodities sector. They highlight the growing share of 
the service sector in Brazilian OFDI, and as examples we can refer to the constructions sector 
and companies such as Odebrecht or Guiterrez, but even some high-tech companies are more 
and more active outside Brazil, such as Datasul, Lupatech or Stefanini. Other authors (Casanova, 
2016: 33; Amann, 2009) also refer to some outstanding examples, where home-grown techno-
logy and innovation has driven the successful internationalization strategies (examples can be 
Embraer, Embrapa, or even the Camargo Correa).
Historically Brazilian firms tended to open up commercial offices to support their export 
activities as their first steps to expand abroad. During the early 2000s greenfield investments 
were the preferred mode of entry in foreign markets by Brazilian firms, mainly in the mining and 
energy industry (with Petrobras leading the row by overseas energy investments, but even the 
Ambev entered into other Latin American markets via greenfield investment – mainly for mar-
ket-seeking reasons) (Sauvant, 2006: 344). This trend has changed significantly and with OFDI 
flows gaining momentum by 2006 cross border mergers and acquisitions became the main form 
of Brazilian companies’ foreign investments.
Looking at the regional distribution of Brazilian OFDI, we see that historically Brazilian out-
ward FDI used to be accumulated in its “natural market”, composed by its immediate neigh-
bourhood, the Latin American region, and some other Portuguese speaking countries (Portugal, 
and some of its former colonies in West-Africa). In a wider sense the Ibero-American world can 
also be regarded as a natural market for Brazil, as it shares strong similarities both cultural and 
institutional terms (Casanova, 2016: 31).
If focusing on real foreign direct transactions, and leaving aside the flows into tax havens 
(such as those in the Caribbean Islands, e.g. the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands and 
the Bahamas), the European region and the United States gain importance, as final destinations 
of Brazilian OFDI. Looking at accumulated investment stocks the EU has overtaken Latin Ame-
rica in 2009 and became the main recipient of Brazilian investments. In Europe, however we also 
have to be cautious because of the strong dominance of countries (Denmark, Netherlands, Lu-
xembourg, and more recently Austria), where through setting up special purpose entities Brazi-
lian firms primarily aim at avoiding the burdensome domestic taxes and bypassing complicated 
Brazilian regulations.
It is worth to recall that the two main export markets for Brazilian products are traditionally Uni-
ted States and most recently China. Thus, the large presence of Brazilian multinational firms and their 
foreign direct investments in these countries might reflect their market-seeking strategies and the aim 
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to achieve proximity to main customers. According to Sheng and Carrera (2018: 6) even though some 
changes in foreign asset to total asset (FA/TA) ratio for some countries (notably for Fibria and Mar-
copolo) in 2016 can be observed, these changes were not due to any major new investments abroad, 
rather due to losses in the domestic market. Amidst a multi-dimensional economic, social, political 
and institutional crisis in Brazil, most firms were focusing their resources on defending their domestic 
activities (or having been involved in the overarching corruption scandal paying off the record-break-
ing fines, such as the Odebrecht or Petrobras), and often even withdrawing investments from overseas.
In general Europe did not represent any special priority in the localization strategies of the 
Brazilian companies, nor was there any government priority to promote the expansion of Bra-
zilian firms towards the European market. This process was rather driven by the companies 
themselves, and their own priorities to follow the clients, search for new markets, or the desire 
to acquire knowledge in Europe. Within the European region during the last years the United 
Kingdom has received the most Brazilian FDI, while traditionally Spain and Portugal have been 
leading the way, but some companies are also present in Germany, France and Italy.
4.3 Brazilian companies going global: push factors and public policies
Before mapping the drivers of internationalization of Brazilian MNEs, it is worth to mention 
the specificities of the Brazilian context: such as the role of family-owned business, and the strong, 
albeit changing role of state-ownership with direct and indirect state influence, as well as resource 
abundance and the role of the primary resources in the domestic economy. In the same vein the 
long historical period of the ISI policies (with a peak in the 60s and 70s) has also left important 
consequences on the organizational structures and on the operation of companies in Brazil.
Brazil has also followed the usual developmentalist economic policy strategy to promote “national 
champions”, and this reveals strong similarity to its Asian counterparts, including China. National 
champions were either state-owned, or (directly or indirectly) state-backed large, specialized domes-
tic firms that were protected from competition and have benefitted from government (export) subsi-
dies and became leaders in their respective industries. These were created and supported to drive the 
industrialization of the economy and serve as major engines for economic development (including 
aims such as employment creation, growth promotion and gaining access and prestige in internati-
onal markets) (Casanova, 2009). After the years of liberalization and privatization during the 1990s, 
many of the former national champions maintained and even improved their leading positons in the 
Brazilian and international markets (such as Embraer, Vale and Petrobras).
According to a recent survey on the top 20 Brazilian MNE’s ranked in terms of foreign assets, the 
primary reasons for investing abroad were the following (Sheng – Carrera, 2017: 10): 1. Access to new 
markets; 2. Proximity to clients; 3. Cost reduction; 4. Access to natural resources; 5. High taxes and 
institutional voids in Brazil (such as corruption, poor transportation system and unqualified labour 
force). Some companies have also cited access to new technologies, however the overall ranking and 
relevance of this factor, was much lower, than in the case of the above mentioned drivers.
As an important driving force to support OFDI flows in Brazil (as in some other emerging 
economies, such as China) we turn towards analysing the role of public policies, especially the 
role of the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) to improve capital availability (via 
providing cheaper long-term credit in certain strategic sectors).
Until the 2000s the direct promotion of outward investment has not entered the economic 
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policy agenda in Brazil. The early stage (during the 60s and 70s) of internationalization of Brazili-
an companies was largely driven by the companies themselves (Fleury-Fleury, 2011; Ricz, 2017), 
and the state has not played a key (direct) role in this (early) process. Since the early 2000s some 
new forms of BNDES support appeared, yet these remained stand-alone programs, and there has 
been no comprehensive strategy to support the global expansion of Brazilian firms. This is in stark 
contrast with China and some other Asian countries (like Japan, or South Korea), where the „deve-
lopmentalist“ governments have since the beginnings played a key role in the internationalization 
of firms and actively supported the global competitiveness of their strategic industries.
Outward FDI flows from Brazil and public policies to promote these, came onto the develop-
ment agenda only after the economic stabilization in the mid of the 90s, however the progressive 
liberalization of capital accounts, have to be regarded as an important prerequisite for these. There 
is a great number of public policy areas where the state can influence the internationalization of 
firms, ranging from labour policies via trade policies to privatization and public utility regulatory 
frameworks and taxation (Finchelstein, 2017). Nevertheless the focus here is on those explicit poli-
cy interventions that directly promote the international expansion of Brazilian companies. 
With the new, active industrial policies of the Workers Party (PT) governments since 2003, 
different types of (above described) state influence were maintained and strengthened (via golden 
shares, indirect state-ownership via pension funds and the national development bank), and new 
credit lines were put in operation, to help the internationalization of the national champions.
The first direct instrument to promote the internationalization of Brazilian companies goes 
back to 1998, when a separate credit line was introduced by the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES) to help foreign governments to realize large infrastructure projects (mainly in Latin 
America and Africa6) by hiring Brazilian engineering companies. It is worth to note however 
that during the first five years only five projects were funded, all of them in South America, with 
an average disbursement of 74 million US dollars per year (Caseiro – Masiero, 2014: 242).
The second instrument aiming at directly financing Brazilian companies to invest abroad 
was put in place in 2002 and included both loans and subscription of securities. This credit line 
was first used only in 2005 (when the JBS acquired the Argentine subsidiary of its American 
competitor, the Swift company) (Sennes – Mendes, 2009). In the same year (2005) as an import-
ant complementary measure the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) removed the prior authorization 
requirement of all OFDI projects above the 5 million US dollar threshold.
In 2007 with the adoption of the „Production Development Policy“ (PDP), the new indust-
rial policy plan, explicit goals for OFDI support were laid down, and a more coherent policy 
approach (however short-lived) started. The PDP has set the strategic goal of expanding and 
consolidating the international leadership of Brazilian EMNEs in those strategic industries, in 
which Brazil has already possessed international competitiveness, such as aeronautics, oil and 
gas, petrochemical, ethanol, mining, steel, pulp and paper and meat (MDIC, 2008)7.
Between 2005 and 2011 the BNDES supported the internationalization of Brazilian compa-
nies by 4.9 billion US dollars, and this consisted almost exclusively of securities subscription. 
6 BNDES loans were essential to make Brazilian companies competitive against the expanding Chinese 
companies, that were also supported by their government.
7 „Keep or position the local productive system amongst the top 5 world exporters/global players.”
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In addition, the BNDES continued to finance overseas infrastructural projects with an annual 
average summing up to 1.1 billion US dollars between 2007 and 2012, when the total number 
of these projects exploded to 97 (Caseiro-Masiero, 2014: 242). Even though the international 
expansion of technology-intensive companies also emerged among the goals, in reality the over-
whelming majority (more than 95 per cent) of the BNDES financed OFDI projects went to meat 
processing companies (such as JBS and Mafrig).
Furthermore the extensive financing of domestic operation of Brazilian MNEs via the develop-
ment bank has freed up earnings to fund OFDI projects even for those companies that borrowed 
from BNDES only for domestic projects – for which the BNDES has usually set lower interest rates. 
BNDES disbursements were responsible for 72 per cent of long term credit for companies in Bra-
zil in the early 2010s. In the light of the traditionally high domestic interest rates in Brazil several 
authors (such as Masiero et al., 2014; Musacchio – Lazzarini, 2014) emphasize, that the BNDES 
has taken advantage of its oligopolistic position in the industrial credit supply and increased its 
shareholder stake in some of the largest Brazilian MNEs8. In some large MNEs (Vale, Embraer) the 
BNDES even has golden shares, giving the bank veto power in several important decisions, but also 
in other cases the bank’s ability to influence operational decisions has expanded.
It was not only the BNDES operations explicitly financing OFDI projects that the bank hel-
ped Brazilian MNES to expand beyond the Brazilian market. Several domestic acquisitions were 
also financed, and led to intra-industry consolidation of domestic markets, while strengthening 
the positions of the so called „national champions“ and implicitly and indirectly harming the 
small and medium sized enterprises.
After heavy critics (and strengthening pressure from Brazilian business elite), and as a con-
sequence of change in the presidency (with important discontinuities in economic policy de-
cisions), but also in the light of worsening economic indicators a new industrial policy document 
was instated in 2011, the Bigger Brazil (Brasil Maior) plan. This has contained the reorientation of 
industrial policy priorities, while it has also foreseen to support OFDI not only in already highly 
competitive industries, but to promote to obtain foreign technologies and/or access to new mar-
kets. To this priority however no specific goal and no further policy instrument or action was 
instituted, thus no implementation followed. Caseiro and Masiero (2014:244) write about the „in-
terruption of the global champions policy“, and cite Luciano Coutinho (the BNDES president by 
that time) saying that the number of those sectors, in which Brazilian companies are internatio-
nally competitive enough to be promoted as potential global champions is limited, and he cannot 
see other sectors, with the same potential. Thus in his opinion, the policy aiming at supporting the 
internationalization of large Brazilian MNEs has run its course and thus it has been concluded.
There were also other factors beyond these changes of public policies that have also cont-
ributed to the reversal of international expansion of large Brazilian companies. In the case of 
Petrobras for example, behind the decisions of discontinuing some overseas projects and selling 
8 This argumentation is in line with the views of Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014) describing the transfor-
mation of state capitalism in line with changes in forms of the state-ownership, and highlighting new forms 
and channels of exerting state power. In this vein the Brazilian government applies the minority sharehol-
der approach to maintain some power to protect the nationality and influence the investment decisions of 
main Brazilian MNEs.
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foreign assets after 2011, the prioritization of domestic market, and the challenges of exploration 
of the „recently“ discovered pre-salt reserves have certainly played an important role. While 
more recently the fall in oil prices, and later on the evolving corruption scandal has forced the 
company to oversee its investment strategy and announce several divestment plans.
Even though we have argued that between 2007 and 2011 a relative coherent policy framework 
existed in Brazil to promote the internationalization of Brazilian companies, there were several bar-
riers constraining the achievement of coherent action. As examples we might cite the lack of Bila-
teral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs) with main partner countries.
We conclude that the Brazilian „going global policy” was part of a more defensive industrial 
policy strategy (compared to the Chinese one). The majority of the OFDI disbursement from 
BNDES has gone into traditional leading sectors of the Brazilian economy (to the core of the so 
called Brazilian industrial complex developed during the ISI period), with main focus on the 
sectors of meat processing, construction and petrochemicals. The subsidized loans provided by 
the BNDES between 2007 and 2011 went disproportionally to large companies, that would have 
been able to obtain credit on the international financial markets (Musacchio-Lazzarini, 2014, 
Massi, 2014), as they were the most competitive players of the Brazilian economy. Whereas the 
promotion of SMEs, as potential future global players or aims such as to capture dynamic com-
parative advantages of host markets, and/or alleviating the bottlenecks in the domestic markets 
were and remained out of the scope and focus of the Brazilian OFDI strategy.
5. A comparative perspective and final remarks
The rise of emerging market multinationals is a new and dynamic process, while their appro-
ach towards their host economies are relatively unique compared to more developed MNEs. In 
this paper we summarized the existing theories of internationalization and foreign direct invest-
ment, presenting the mainstream theories and some of the new theoretical avenues. The analy-
sis used a comparative approach and examined the similarities as well as differences regarding 
emerging outward FDI. After presenting the main features of Chinese and Brazilian outward 
foreign direct investment globally, we narrowed down our focus on the major driving forces – fo-
cusing mainly on push factors and especially on the role of home country governments - behind 
the international expansion strategies of Chinese and Brazilian MNEs. 
As mentioned above, Chinese and Brazilian outward FDI in emerging or developing countri-
es is characterized more by resource-seeking motives. Both Chinese and Brazilian companies in 
the developed world are rather focusing on buying themselves into global brands or distribution 
channels, getting acquainted with local management skills and technology, the so-called stra-
tegic assets. Regarding modes of entry, investments shifted from greenfield projects to mergers 
and acquisitions in both countries, which represents currently around two-thirds of all Chinese 
outward FDI in value. This shift is driven by the financial crisis, however it also seems to be a 
new trend of Chinese FDI to the developed world, while greenfield investment remains signifi-
cant in the developing world. Outward FDI has also become more diversified in the past years 
both in China and Brazil: from mining and manufacturing it turned towards high technology, 
infrastructure and heavy industry, and lately to the tertiary sector, business services and finance 
but also health care, media and entertainment. This structural shift is however much more pro-
nounced in China, as in Brazil there are only a handful companies active in the high-tech sector. 
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Asia continues to be the largest recipient, accounting for nearly three-quarters of total Chi-
nese outward FDI, followed by the EU, Australia, the US, Russia and Japan. Numbers might be 
misleading though due to round-tripping (the investment is placed in offshore financial centres 
only to flow it back in the form of inward FDI to China to benefit from fiscal incentives designed 
for foreign investors). According to project-level analysis, 60 percent of Chinese outward FDI is 
aimed at developed economies like Australia, Hong Kong, the United States, Germany, and Ca-
nada. Similarly, Brazilian companies if investing beyond their natural market, are mainly active 
in the United States, China and the United Kingdom. In the European Union Portugal and Spain 
have been leading the way for hosting Brazilian MNE’s, but some companies are also present in 
Germany, France and Italy. Brazilian OFDI to the ECE countries is characterised by very low 
volume and high year-to year volatility and tends to stay mostly below any threshold of inter-
national surveys. With the strengthening of diplomatic ties and a new foreign policy friendship 
between Hungary and Brazil, there might be some changes in this regard in the future.
As for Chinese outward FDI to the European Union, the Eurozone crisis attracted Chinese 
investors due to falling prices. Whereas similarly to the Brazilian case Chinese investors have 
also preferred „old European“ investment destinations not only because of market size but also 
because of well-established, sound economic relations with these countries. Chinese investment 
in ECE constitutes a relatively small share in China’s total FDI in Europe and is quite a new 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is on the rise and may increase further due to recent political de-
velopments between China and certain countries of the region. 
By comparing the Chinese and Brazilian OFDI strategies, we can conclude, that Chinese OFDI strat-
egy has taken a much more aggressive stance to promote Chinese companies abroad, while its Brazilian 
counterpart was a rather defensive one. Brazilian industrial policies were focusing on already existing 
dynamic comparative advantages, as they preferred to support industries, that were already highly com-
petitive internationally, and did not promote further structural changes in the domestic economy. 
In contrast, the Chinese government has promoted OFDI mainly to secure access to highly 
needed natural resources, while there were also examples of market-seeking and efficiency-seeking 
motivations, however more recently the desire to acquire new technologies and managerial expe-
rience also came to fore. We especially underline that the Chinese government has promoted and 
guided OFDI with the main aim to acquire assets that were scarce in the country or considered to 
be crucial for the further development of the domestic economy. For this aim it has mainly focused 
on the dynamic comparative advantages available in the host countries. In contrast, the Brazilian 
government has been much more relying on its own existing dynamic comparative advantages 
(instead of aiming at creating new ones), and promoted traditional leading companies’ internatio-
nal expansion (which might have been successful internationally also without state intervention). 
In international comparison among the emerging countries the Brazilian OFDI policies seem to 
be less interventionist9 (less relying on direct state interventions and interference), which especialy-
ly stands out if compared to China. The Brazilian government is exercising direct power only over 
the two state-owned companies (Petrobras and Banco do Brasil), while in other cases it is „only“ 
a minority shareholder and exerts rather indirect influence on some strategic companies and their 
9 While of course on the other end of the extreme lie even more liberal regimes, such as Chile or the majo-
rity of the more advanced countries.
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investment decisions. As mentioned above, although Chinese state-owned enterprises account for a 
large majority of OFDI, there are new forms of profit-oriented and competition-driven state-control-
led enterprises, while there are several private firms and public-private hybrids, that have also been 
able to became successful companies on the Chinese market as well as globally. These non-state - but 
politically supported - national firms are considered and treated as ‘national champions’. 
On the other hand however the Brazilian state used to be almost exclusive provider of long 
term (subsidized) credit via the Brazilian development bank (the BNDES), which made its inf-
luence excessively strong (if compared to other more developed economies), albeit rather via 
indirect channels. All in all we can state that with some exception of infrastructural projects in 
Latin America and Africa, the Brazilian government has not directly influenced OFDI allocation 
decisions, such as it was more often the case for the Chinese government.
Finally we conclude, that though looking at the numbers and tendencies both strategies seem 
to have been successful in the eve of the twenty-first century, however in terms of longer term 
economic development perspectives differences prevail. The Chinese OFDI strategy might be 
more promising in this regard, as it has much larger potential to promote those structural chan-
ges and positive spillovers in the domestic economy, which are highly required to escape the 
middle-income trap (this finding is in line with Caseiro and Masiero, 2014). 
Our initial aim was to identify those push factors and public policy mechanism that influences 
the international expansion strategy of non-European EMNEs, by comparing Chinese and Brazili-
an OFDI. Although we have found many similarities as well as differences on the macro level, but 
a number of gaps remained in our knowledge on the micro level. Therefore, a further possible step 
of our research could be company case studies - the analysis of the investment strategies of a few 
Chinese as well as Brazilian companies - that will allow us to investigate the topic in far more detail.
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